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A "network interdictor" has a limited supply of resource with which to disrupt a
"network user's" flow of supplies in a capacitated transshipment network. The
interdictor' s problem of minimizing the maximum flow through the network is a difficult-
to-solve integer programming problem but we show that a heuristic based on Lagrangian
relaxation is very effective in approximately solving the problem.
We implement algorithms in C to approximately solve both the static (without
considering time) and dynamic network interdiction problems. Static test networks range
in size from 25 nodes and 64 arcs to 400 nodes and 1519 arcs. Using an IBM RS/6000
Model 590 workstation, we find optimal solutions for seven of 12 test networks and solve
the largest problem in only 31.0 seconds. We model a dynamic network in time-expanded
form in order to assign time weights of or 1 to flow, include repair time of interdicted
arcs, and provide a schedule to the network interdictor that identifies arcs and time
periods for interdictions. Dynamic networks range in size from 525 nodes and 1,344 arcs
to 40,400 nodes and 153,419 arcs (in time-expanded form). We find near-optimal
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Opponents face each other in a field of battle. The environment and terrain affect
both sides equally. To remain ready for battle, both sides need a constant supply of food,
fuel, and repair parts; disruptions of those flows cause an immediate loss of combat
power. In this scenario, one side uses a transportation network to provide supplies,
troops, and ammunition to his forces. The other side, far from home, has the ability to
identify his opponent's supply points and to temporarily stop movement of supplies over
segments of that opponent's transportation network.
This thesis develops mathematical programming methods for the effective
employment of limited interdiction assets to reduce the flow of a single commodity
through a capacitated transportation (transshipment) network. The network user strives
to maximize flow of a commodity through the network, while an interdictor, with limited
assets, attempts to interdict (destroy) arcs or links in the network to minimize the
maximum flow. We develop a dynamic model that allows the interdictor to assign time
weights of or 1 to the arrival of war material at battlefield destinations. The interdictor
allocates his resources appropriately, keeping in mind that interdicted arcs can be repaired
over time.
While this thesis is motivated by the possibility of weakening the military force of
the network user before engagement in battle, other uses may include disrupting the
escape routes of a fugitive or reducing the flow of illegal drugs and precursor chemicals
moving through a network of rivers and roads. This problem has been studied before,
during the Vietnam War and, more recently, in support of the war on illegal drugs.
Previous studies have not modeled the time aspect of moving logistics through a
network. By representing the network in time-expanded form, we can define a specific
time period of interest, include attributes such as a time-weighted value for flows arriving
at sinks, the repair of arcs after interdiction, and a schedule for the employment of
interdiction assets.
XI
We assign time weights of or 1 to flow arriving at a sink. We give value of 1 to
flow arriving at a sink before the end of a "cutoff' time and otherwise. A more general
version of the dynamic network model might include arbitrary non-negative time weights
but is beyond the scope of this thesis. We model repair of arcs by allowing interdictions to
be effective for limited periods of time. We assume complete interdiction of an arc until
repair, i.e., an interdicted arc has zero capacity until it is repaired. A repaired arc is
restored to its nominal capacity.
The network interdiction problem is difficult to solve due to the interdiction
budget constraint for the network interdictor. We relax this constraint using a Lagrangian
relaxation that allows the interdictor to violate the constraint while paying a penalty. For a
fixed value of a penalty parameter, the relaxation is an easy-to-solve maximum flow
problem with a solution that provides a lower bound on the optimal solution to the
network interdiction problem. The solution may or may not be feasible. We maximize the
lower bound using binary search on the value of the penalty parameter, solving a
maximum flow problem at each step. The best feasible solution obtained is the heuristic
solution to the problem. The maximized lower bound and the objective value of the
solution to the best feasible solution are compared to judge solution quality.
We implement algorithms to approximately solve both the static (without
considering time) and dynamic network interdiction problems in C using an IBM RS/6000
Model 590 workstation. The static test networks range in size from 25 nodes and 64 arcs
to 400 nodes and 1519 arcs. We find optimal solutions for seven of 12 test networks
solving the largest problem in only 31.0 seconds. Dynamic networks range in size from
525 nodes and 1,344 arcs to 40,400 nodes and 153,419 arcs (in time-expanded form). We
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Opponents face each other in a field of battle. The environment and terrain affect
both sides equally. To remain ready for battle, both sides need a constant supply of food,
fuel, and repair parts. Disruptions of those flows cause an immediate loss of combat
power. In this battle, one side uses a transportation network to provide supplies, troops,
and ammunition to his forces. The other side, far from home, has the ability to identify
his opponent's supply points and to temporarily stop movement of supplies over
segments of the opponent's transportation network.
This thesis develops new mathematical programming methods for the effective
employment of limited interdiction assets to reduce the time-weighted flow (weights are
or 1) of a single commodity through a capacitated transshipment network. The network
user strives to maximize flow of a commodity through the network, while an interdictor,
with limited assets, attempts to interdict (destroy) arcs or links in the network to
minimize the maximum flow. The interdictor knows that his adversary values the
commodity differently depending upon its time of arrival. The interdictor therefore gives
weighted values to the arrival of war material at battlefield destinations and wishes to
allocate his resources appropriately keeping in mind that broken arcs can be repaired over
time. While this thesis is motivated by possibility of weakening the military force of the
network user before engagement in battle, other uses may include disrupting the escape
routes of a fugitive or reducing the flow of illegal drugs and precursor chemicals moving
through a network of rivers and roads.
We introduce the reader to the network interdiction problem and its notation in
this chapter. We heuristically solve a static model in Chapter II using a Lagrangian
relaxation heuristic that relaxes the network interdictor's resource budget constraint.
Although the network interdiction problem is difficult to solve, later, we see that this
method often produces an optimal solution. In Chapter EI we introduce the reader to the
dynamic model and the time-expanded form of a network. Through the dynamic models
presented in Chapter HI, we can consider time-weighted flow and the repair of interdicted
arcs. Our solutions tell the interdictor not only where to strike but also when to strike. A
Lagrangian heuristic provides reliable solutions for the dynamic network, also.
A. BACKGROUND
Using limited resources, an interdictor attempts to restrict an enemy's use of a
capacitated transshipment network. For a military interdictor, the immediate objective
could be to decrease the fighting effectiveness of the enemy by minimizing the amount of
supplies such as shipments of fuel, repair parts, ammunition, available to the enemy
commander who is the "network user." Another objective might be to limit the enemy
commander's ability to maneuver for a specified time period by destroying the bridges and
roads around him. We model the logistic network as a single-commodity dynamic
transshipment network with capacities and transit times on its arcs. The network has
several sources, the supply points, and several sinks, the military units in the field. Arc
capacities restrict flow rates while transit times determine how long each unit of flow
spends traversing the network.
The goal of the network user is to move an appropriate amount of flow, the war
material, out of each source and into each sink. The interdictor decides which arcs to
interdict, the "interdiction set," while recognizing the time-weighted value of the logistics.
In this thesis, the values of the time weights are or 1 for reasons explained later. Each
interdiction consumes an amount of a limited resource that may depend on the particular
arc. There is a fixed amount of total resource available to the interdictor. Our models do
not allow partial interdiction; interdicted arcs have zero capacity until repaired. We
assume that the network user repairs each interdicted arc, restoring the arc to full capacity
within a specified number of time units.
In this chapter, we introduce the notation and models used in solving a simple
network interdiction problem. We describe the problem from the network user's point of
view, the maximum flow model. Building on the maximum flow model, we develop the
network interdiction model. This model, an integer program, finds an interdiction set that
minimizes the maximum network flow subject to limited assets.
In Chapter II, we solve the static network interdiction problem. The integer
program for this model is hard to solve in practice, so we use a Lagrangian relaxation
heuristic to solve the problem approximately. By adding small random amounts to arc
capacities, the heuristic often finds an optimal solution.
We address the time-expanded network and repair of arcs in Chapter III. We use
a single commodity dynamic transshipment network in time-expanded form. This form of
the network allows us introduce a time-weighted aspect to network flow and to model the
repair and possible re-attack of interdicted arcs during the time periods under
consideration. We assume complete repair of arcs at the end of a repair interval. Our
solution identifies a set of arcs to interdict and the time period in which to attack or re-
attack these arcs.
B. NETWORKS AND INTERDICTION
We first address interdiction in a static network, that is, one without time
attributes. We present the maximum flow, minimum cut, and a simple network
interdiction model to help the reader understand the basic problem. Most definitions
follow Cormican (1995).
1. Description of a Static Network
We define a network with respect to a directed graph G - (N, A) where N is a set
of n nodes and A is a set ofm directed "edges" or "arcs." In a transshipment network, an
arc (i,j) can be thought of as a length of roadway, river segment, etc., that provides a
path for the flow of a commodity from /' to j. A node, /, can be thought of as a road
junction or the endpoint of a road segment. A commodity flowing through the network
originates at a "source node" a^N'm the network and flows to "sink node" beN. If there
is more than one source or sink, we create a "super-source" and/or a "super-sink" and
artificial arcs with appropriately large capacities linking them to the sources and sinks,
respectively. This idea is graphically presented in Figure 1
. We expand the set of arcs A
to include the artificial arcs and another artificial "return arc," {b,a) , from the sink to the
source or (b' ,a') from the supersink b y to the supersource a'
.
Sink 1 Source 1 Sinkl
Super-sink
Sink 2
(a) Original network (b) Network with artificial arcs
Figure 1 . Network with and without artificial arcs.
Each arc (i,j) has an associated set of parameters that describes its





> 0. The capacity of the artificial return arc is large, such as
T]«« + 1 - The cost, in units of resource, to interdict an arc (i,j) is designated rl} , and
0J)eA
is typically assumed to be a small integer. It may occur that an arc cannot be interdicted at





. The interdictor has a total ofR units of resource available for interdiction. In this
thesis, we assume a single type of interdiction resource. A natural extension would
include multiple types of interdiction resources available to the attacker and arcs that
require specific types of resource to interdict them.
2. Network Maximum Flow Models
The task of the network user is to move supplies from the sources to the sinks.
The standard maximum flow linear programming model (e.g., Ahuja, Magnanti, and Orlin
1993, p. 168) determines the maximum quantity of a single commodity that can be moved
through a capacitated network from source node a to sink node b. This maximum flow
model, denoted MF, is:
MF
Indices:
/', j<=N Nodes of G = (N, A) , includes two special nodes: a, the source or super-
source and b, the sink or super-sink








Amount of flow on arc (i,j)
The Formulation:
max x <*ua^ variables
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is the flow of the commodity from node / to nodey on directed arc
(i,j) e A , and xba is the flow from sink node b to source node a, on artificial arc (b,a)
,
the return arc. The flow on arc (b,a) is the sum of all the flows from the source to the
sink. Maximizing flow xba is equivalent to maximizing flow through the network. The
flow balance constraints (1) require that the flow arriving at a node equal the flow leaving
the node. The capacity constraints (2) require a non-negative flow on an arc that is not
greater than the capacity of the arc.
The dual of the maximum flow problem is the minimum cut problem. The dual




are shown in MF. When we find an
optimal solution to a maximum flow problem, we also find an optimal solution to the
minimum cut problem.
A "cut" is a partition of the node set N into two sets N
a
and Nb , with a eNa
and b eNb . Each cut defines a set of arcs that have one endpoint in Na and the other
endpoint in Nb . With respect to the cut, an arc (i,j) is a "forward" arc if it is directed
from a node / e N
a
to a node j
; eNb . The capacity of the cut is the sum of the capacities
of all the forward arcs associated with the cut. A minimum cut, then, is a cut of minimum
capacity among all possible cuts in the network. (The above definitions follow Ahuja et al.
(1993).) By the maximum flow-minimum cut theorem (Ford and Fulkerson, 1956), the
maximum flow equals the capacity of a minimum cut. A minimum cut can be found
directly by solving the dual of the maximum flow problem MFD (e.g., Wood, 1993):
MFD
Indices:
i, j&N Nodes of G = (N, A) , includes two special nodes: a, the source or super-
source and b, the sink or super-sink










= 1 if / g Nb else a, = if /' € Na ,
i} i3












MFD is totally unimodular and if we arbitrarily set a
a
=0, then all variables will
be or 1 in an optimal extreme point solution. The variables in the model have the
following physical interpretation: a
t
= 1 indicates izNb , a t =0 indicates i&Na ,
6
tj
= 1 indicates arc (i,j) i eN
a , j eNb , and 1} = 0, otherwise.
3. The Network Interdiction Model
The network interdiction problem can be formalized in a min-max flow-based
model. The network user attempts to maximize the flow across the network, while the
interdictor simultaneously strives to minimize this maximum flow. The network




/', jgN Nodes of G = (N, A) , includes two special nodes: a, the source or super-
source and b, the sink or super-sink




Nominal capacity of arc (/', j)
r
tj Amount of resource required to interdict arc (/',_/)
R Total amount of resource for interdiction available to the network interdictor
Network user decision variables:
Xy Amount of flow on arc (/',/)
Network interdictor decision variables:
Yii Yij - 1 indicates arc (i,j) is interdicted; else y v =
The Formulation:
z* = min max xba (5)




< Wy (i- r .) V(i,j)eA (7)
where Y \y\ J^r9r9 ^ R, Y, e {0,1} V(/,y) g A (8)
The objective function (5) seeks to minimize the maximum flow. Constraints (6)
are just the flow balance constraints from MF. The arc capacity constraints (7) restrict the
amount of flow on the arc to either the nominal capacity if the arc is not interdicted or
zero if the arc is interdicted. In this model, y tJ =1 if arc (i,j) is interdicted and y v =0 i£
the arc is not interdicted. Interdiction resource constraint (8) limits the interdiction
decisions. Each interdiction consumes an amount of interdiction resource, r
y
. The total
resource consumed by the interdiction set must be less than the amount of resource
available R.
Wood (1993) shows that the inner maximum flow model can be converted to its
dual and the minimum cut model and the resulting nonlinear integer program linearized.
This model is a simple minimizing integer program that will be addressed in Chapter II
together with a solution method using Lagrangian relaxation.
C. LITERATURE SEARCH
There was strong interest in the network interdiction problem during the Vietnam
War. Works during this time period were either very general, such as Wollmer (1964), to
the very specific also by Wollmer (1970). More recently, the war on illegal drugs
generated new interest in network interdiction, Phillips (1992). There are other
contributors to the topic but almost all these works share the characteristic of being
specific to the application and not easily generalizable. More recent works by Steinrauf
(1991), Wood (1993) and Cormican (1995) overcome this limitation by adopting a
mathematical programming approach. The advantage of this approach is that it readily
generalizes and is easily adaptable to a variety of network interdiction problems. These
mathematical models, however, are integer and mixed-integer programs that are difficult
to solve. Wood (1993) shows that the basic network interdiction problem is NP-
complete, even when restricted to planar graphs where interdictions require varying
amounts of resource, or to non-planar graphs requiring only one unit of resource to
interdict any arc.
We have found no sources that address the network interdiction problem in time-
expanded form. Only Wollmer (1970) addresses repair time of arcs. Wollmer allows
partial interdiction of arcs and finds the best single arc to break, repeating the process for
multiple interdictions. His algorithm selects an arc for interdiction that maximizes the sum
of the repair cost plus the product of the repair time and the cost increase of a minimum-
cost circulation flow. Wollmer' s methodology determines an approximately optimal
interdiction set in exponential time.
Ratliff, Sicillia, and Lubore (1975) solve the network interdiction problem by
finding a set of n arcs whose simultaneous removal from a connected single commodity
network results in the greatest decrease in the throughput capacity of the remaining
system between the source and the sink. The method applies to planar and non-planar
networks but addresses neither a dynamic network nor repair of arcs.
Steinrauf (1991) develops a mathematical programming approach for the network
interdiction problem using integer programming. It solves small problems but is not very
useful for large integer problems. A relaxation or decomposition is needed.
Cormican (1995) develops a deterministic model using Benders decomposition
with an original "flow-dispersion heuristic." The flow-dispersion heuristic achieves a
maximum flow while keeping flows on individual arcs as small as possible. This serves to
decrease solution time by reducing the number of iterations that Benders decomposition
requires for convergence. Cormican extends the method to include stochastic arc
capacities.
Phillips (1992) describes pseudo-polynomial time algorithms that provide the
interdictor with a strategy that optimally uses exactly the amount of resources he is willing
to commit to the attack. Phillips proves that for a fixed cut, a greedy attack strategy is
optimal. A greedy attack strategy is one that removes as much of the cut's fixed capacity
as possible, expending exactly the entire interdiction budget. A simple algorithm for the
network interdictor's problem would enumerate all cuts, (an exponential number are
possible), compute the result of a greedy attack on each, and pick the best one. Phillips'
method does not solve an integer problem and instead assigns some benefit to partial
interdictions. Recognizing the need for faster algorithms, Phillips proposes pseudo-
polynomial-time algorithms for planar graphs and shows how to convert them into fully
polynomial-time approximation schemes.
Wood (1993) develops integer programming models for the network interdiction
problem and its variations. He develops a simple minimization model that is derived from
the formal min-max network interdiction model. The problem is shown to be NP
complete. He does not consider the time-expanded dynamic network.
This thesis continues the work of others to develop mathematical programming
models for the network interdiction problem. We seek to include aspects associated with
time in our models by using a time-expanded form. This form allows us to model time
weights on flow of or 1 and arcs that are repaired a certain amount of time after
10
interdiction. We have already introduced the maximum flow model with its dual and the
standard network interdiction model. In Chapter II, we develop the network interdiction
problem in its simpler, static form, without time attributes, and present a Lagrangian
relaxation heuristic to find a good feasible set of arcs to interdict.
11
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n. SOLVING THE BASIC MODEL
In Chapter I, we presented the standard network interdiction problem S-NIM.
Because S-NIM involves static flows, i.e., does not involve flows over time, we call it a
"static version" of the network interdiction problem to differentiate it from the "dynamic
version" covered in Chapter III. Wood (1993) shows that the static network interdiction
problem is NP-complete, even when restricted to planar graphs where interdictions require
varying amounts of resource. In this chapter, we seek faster methods to solve the static
problem (at least approximately) using Lagrangian relaxation. Although not guaranteed to
find an optimal solution, optimal solutions are consistently obtained by the Lagrangian
relaxation method described in this chapter when r
l}
= 1 for all arcs (i,j)
.
A. THE INTEGER PROBLEM
Recall from Chapter I that the standard network interdiction model, S-NIM, is
stated as a min-max problem where the network user attempts to maximize flow across
the network while the interdictor is simultaneously striving to minimize that flow subject
to the interdiction budget constraint.
For a fixed interdiction decision, note that the inner maximization of S-NIM is just
a maximum flow problem. We can take the dual of the inner maximum flow model and




z, jgN -Nodes of G = (N, A) , includes two special nodes, a the source or super-
source, and b, the sink or super-sink





Nominal capacity of arc (/',/')
r
i}
Amount of resource required to interdict arc (i,j) , r
i}
> and integer
R Total resource for interdiction available to the network interdictor, R > and
integer
Decision variables:
«, a, = 1 if / e Nb , a, - if / e Na ,
Pl} j5 l} = 1 if arc (/,_/) is in the cut and not interdicted, otherwise /? . -
Yq Yij ~ 1 indicates arc (/,y) is interdicted; otherwise y v =
The Formulation:
z* = min ]£>,,#,
s.t. a
t -aj+r 9 +fi9 Z0 \/(iJ)zA-(b,a)
(Xb-aa+Yba+Pba * ]
a, e {0,1} V/gJV




Note that this model resembles the dual of the maximum flow model, MFD, from
Chapter I, but with
IJ
replaced by y i} + pv . NTM identifies a cut where the variables a x
have the same meaning as in MFD. y and fit represent interdiction decisions and have
the following interpretation: For forward arcs (/',_/') in the cut, a
l
-a.--\ so
Yij + Py — 1 is required. So, either y l} =1, indicating that this arc is interdicted, or
P tJ = 1 , indicating that this arc forms part of the minimum capacity cut after interdiction.
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Yij - P,j ~ outside the cut indicating that these arcs are neither interdicted nor do they
form part of the minimum capacity cut after interdiction.
B. LAGRANGIAN RELAXATION FOR THE SIMPLE INTEGER
PROBLEM
The basic integer program formulation NIM is known to be hard to solve.
Without the complicating interdiction budget constraint (9), the problem is an easy-to-
solve model like MFD. While constraint (9) cannot be ignored, it can be relaxed: We use
a Lagrangian relaxation of the interdiction resource constraint. The relaxation allows us
to approximately solve the problem by moving the resource constraint into the objective
function. The resulting problem is almost as easy to solve as if constraint (9) were
ignored. NIM, with the Lagrangian relaxation, is:
LR(A)
(11)
z{X) = min 2>V£,+AV,)-JK < l0 >
s.t. a
t -aj+ri+fi,*0 V(iJ)eA-(b,a)








The objective function (10) incorporates the resource constraint and a Lagrangian
multiplier X. The function z(X) is a concave function in X so that we can find the best





ij fi ij + /l( ^f,jX„ - R) where the reader can more clearly observea
'r 'P (i,j)eA (iJ)eA
the interdiction resource constraint (9) in the objective function with multiplier A.
Because of the relaxation, z{X) <z* but as we adjust X we may find a multiplier
such that z(X) - z * . In fact when we have found a Lagrangian multiplier such
that 2^7,, =fl, then
VJ)eA
z(X) = min 2X*p +H Sv, - R) = min ^fi, = ,•
.
< 12 >
However, we cannot be assured of an optimal solution if some portion of the interdiction
resource, R, remains unused. In this case, A( ^r
v y v -R) <0 and there may be some
('J)eA
benefit in expending more interdiction resource. Therefore, a solution with Vr^ < R
('J)eA
may not be optimal.
With the interdiction budget constraint in the objective function, LR(A) is
unimodular and can be solved as a linear program. Since the extreme point solutions to
the related dual of the maximum flow problem are binary, we can remove the upper bound
constraints on a
i
and fifj and y v in the linear relaxation without changing the solution.







-aj +r9 +fi9 >0 \/(i,j)zA-(b,a)
ab -aa +rba +fiba >l
a, > V# e N
a
a =0, a b =\
Pv >0 V(i,j)eA
7^0 V(i,j)eA
LRR(/l) looks similar to the dual to the maximum flow problem MFD which also has
integer extreme points. As a result, we may solve LR(A) by solving LRR(A), or more
importantly, through its dual. For a fixed A, the AR term is a constant and remains in the
objective function for the dual. The dual of the relaxed model of the Lagrangian
relaxation is:
-D1(A)







Since the flow must meet both capacity constraints, the capacity constraints can be




. Model LRR-D2(A) is equivalent to LRR-Dl(/l) with
the restated capacity constraint:
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LRR-D2(A)
z{X) = max xba - AR





This is very similar to the maximum flow model, MF, with capacities modified by
the dual cost of interdicting the arc. Any solution to LRR-D2(/l) finds a minimum
capacity cut that corresponds to a feasible or infeasible solution to the original problem
NIM as follows:
a. a, =1 Vi tNb , a, = Vi eNa .
b. py =1 if i eNa ,j e ./Vj, and xjy = w() , i.e., if (i,j) is a forward arc of the





then (i,j) is not interdicted.
c. Xij ~ 1 if ' € jVa ,y g A^6 and xy = Ari} , i.e., if (/,/) is a forward arc of the





then (i,y) is interdicted.
d ^y = ^;> - V (/',_/') that are not forward arcs in the cut.




does not occur. The
solution is feasible if the interdiction budget constraint (9) holds
C. SOLVING THE RELAXED NETWORK INTERDICTION PROBLEM
Given a fixed A, we can find a minimum capacity cut by solving LR(A) using an
easy-to-implement polynomial-time maximum flow algorithm for LRR-D2(/l). Arcs in the
minimum capacity cut, Ac , are examined to find the corresponding interdiction set,
Aj c: Ac , that may or may not be feasible. If A1 is feasible for T, the corresponding
maximum flow value, z is an upper bound for z*, the solution to the network interdiction




the lower bound until the "best" upper bound, the smallest value of z
found, and lower bound are equal, or the difference is as small as possible.
We iteratively solve LR(1) using binary search on A to find a good feasible
solution. We decrease A if
^L^y tj < R encouraging use of more interdiction resource.
We increase A if 2^7 ;> >R, raising the penalty for exceeding the interdiction budget.
We have found an optimal solution to NIM if TV^ - R since for this solution the
equality (12) holds. In words, the lower bound z(A) equals the upper bound z* and we
have found an optimal interdiction set.
The method may fail to find an optimal solution to NIM when it cannot identify a
set of arcs to interdict that consumes the entire interdiction resource budget. One such
failure occurs if the optimal cut found in LRR-D2(/l) is composed of a number of arcs
with equal capacity. For example, the network in Figure 2 consists of five arcs in parallel
between the source and sink with r
l}
- 1 and u
l}
= u V(/,y) . We have three units of
interdiction resource, i.e., R = 3. There is only one cut. For any A, the corresponding
solution to NTM interdicts all arcs (infeasible) or no arcs rather than the R = 3 arcs that are
optimal. Thus, Lagrangian relaxation will never find an optimal solution for this problem.
Figure 2. A network without an easy interdiction set
But, suppose that we add a very small random amount of capacity to each arc.
The algorithm is able to differentiate between arcs that would otherwise appear identical
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and the amount added is small enough not to affect the solution substantially. In practice,
we add a random 1/100,000 to 100/100,000 of capacity to each arc. We accomplish this
by multiplying all capacities by a scaling factor of 100,000 and then add a random amount
that varies uniformly from 1 to 100. This small amount causes only negligible changes in
the maximum flow in the network. This method has the advantage of only increasing
solution time by extra log (100,000) iterations while enabling the algorithm to solve a
difficult problem.
We use a shortest augmenting path algorithm (Edmonds and Karp, 1972) to solve
LRR-D2(X). (See Appendix A.) We modify the algorithm to find the "shortest
augmenting path," the augmenting path with as few arcs as possible, with maximum
capacity. We implement the Lagrangian relaxation and solve the maximum flow problem
to identify the minimum capacity cut Ac and the set of arcs to interdict A 1 c Ac .
We solve this problem for several test cases with the results discussed in Chapter
IV. The shortest augmenting path algorithm used in this thesis has a worst case
complexity of 0(nm 2 ) (Ahuja et al., 1993, p. 213). The methods used to discriminate
between arcs, the random amount and the scaling, add a factor of log(100,000) to the
work of the algorithm. The process of finding the best Lagrangian multiplier using binary
search requires 0(1og(/) solutions of the maximum flow problem where U is the
maximum capacity of an arc in the network. The complexity of the relaxed network
interdiction problem is polynomial:
O(ww 2 (log£/ + log(100,000))) = 0(nm 2 logt/) .
We have tested the relaxed network interdiction problem with many different
networks. With r
l}
= 1 V (/,_/') e A , we often find an optimal solution. We find good
solutions that are sometimes optimal for the more general problem with general integer
h
Building on the material presented in this chapter, we next explore the dynamic
network in time-expanded form.
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ffl. THE TIME-EXPANDED PROBLEM
We have introduced the reader to the static network interdiction problem and will
now develop a dynamic version of that problem. We propose models in which the value
of the flow is time-weighted and interdicted arcs are repaired. In this thesis the time
weights are or 1 depending on the time of arrival of flow at sinks. The solution
identifies arcs and time periods of interdiction.
We introduce the reader to the dynamic model in Section A by developing the
time-expanded maximum flow model. In Section B, we develop the time-expanded
network interdiction model. In Section C, we develop a constrained minimum cut model
from the network interdiction model. In Section D, we use a Lagrangian relaxation to find
a feasible solution of the time-expanded network interdiction model. In Section E, we
present a method that implements the models of Section D to find a feasible interdiction
set for the time-expanded network interdiction problem.
A. DYNAMIC MAXIMUM FLOW MODELS
Dynamic network problems can be solved as traditional network problems on
exponentially (pseudo-polynomially) large, time-expanded networks. Our motivation for
using a dynamic network model is a desire to include additional attributes in the models
such as time-weighted flow, repair time for interdicted arcs, and a schedule for the
network interdictor to use in allocating assets. For a given network G = (N, A) , we form
a time-expanded network G T =(N T ,A T ) as follows: The quantity T represents the
integer-valued time horizon for the dynamic problem consisting of T + 1 time periods; we




,...,iT of each node i. Node i t in the time-expanded network
represents node / in the original network at time t. r
1Jt
is defined as the time required for
a commodity to traverse (/,_/) from / toy at time /. Normally, t 1} = r IJt for all (i,j) e A
and all t. We include arc {i,j)
t
= (i,,j









denotes the amount of flow on (i,j)
t
. In a feasible dynamic flow, at
most u
lJt
units of flow can be sent on arc (i,j)
t





(i,j) gA and all /.
The time-expanded problem requires us to adjust our definition of source and sink.
For each source and sink in the static network, there are T + 1 sources and sinks in the





and artificial arcs from the sinks, b
t
eN t to the super-sink b\ Each of these
artificial arcs is included in A T . We also include an artificial arc "return arc" (b',a') from
the super-sink at time T to the super-source at time to complete the circulation of flow
from the sinks to the sources. The capacity of this arc is large and unconstraining, such as
^m, + 1 . We define the super-source to exist only at time period and the super-sink
only at the last time period T. Artificial arcs connecting the super-source to the regular
source nodes, (a' ,a
t ) , have za , - t . Artificial arcs connecting the sinks to the super-
sink, b\
,
have rbb , = T- 1 . The return arc has rb ,a , t = -T as a notational convenience.
In the dynamic maximum flow problem, the task of the network user is to find the
maximum amount of logistics that can move from the sources to the sinks, subject to arc
capacity constraints. The time-expanded maximum flow model, TE-MF, represents this
problem. Note that the objective function value xb ,a ,T is the return arc representing the
total flow through the time-expanded network. The arrival of the flow at the sinks is not
time-weighted in this model.
TE-MF
Indices:
/', jeN Nodes of G = (N, A) , including two special nodes, a' the super-source, and
b' the super-sink
t,f Time periods: t,t — 0, 1, 2, ... , T
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Traverse time of arc (i,j)
t
; flow leaves / at time / and arrives aty at time t +
Network user decision variable:
x
IJt
















The time-weighted maximum flow problem attaches different values, w jb , t , to the
arc flows depending on their time of arrival at the sink. This attribute recognizes that the
network user does not place equal value to the same shipment of supplies when it arrives

















A completely general dynamic network problem would allow each w jb , t to be an
arbitrary nonnegative value. This would significantly increase the difficulty of the
problem, however, and methods required to solve it are beyond the scope of this thesis.
(Benders decomposition may work; see Cormican (1995).) We use binary weights only:
We assign weights so that flow arriving at sink b, on or before the latest allowable time
period Tb has a value of 1. Flow arriving after this cutoff time Tb has a value of 0. Ifwe
simply remove the artificial arcs from A T that have a time-weighted value of 0, TW-MF is
equivalent to TE-MF.
The dual of the maximum flow problem is the minimum cut problem. The dual




are shown in TE-MF. When
we find an optimal solution to a maximum flow problem, we also find an optimal solution
to the minimum cut problem.
We adjust our definitions pertaining to cuts to fit the time-expanded problem. A
"cut" is a partition of the node set N T into two sets N T
a
, and Nb , , with a 1 e N], and
b' g Nb , . Each cut defines a set of arcs that have one endpoint in N Ta , and the other
endpoint in Nb . . The capacity of the cut is the sum of the capacities of the forward arcs in
the cut. We find a minimum capacity cut by solving TE-MFD:
TE-MFD
Indices:
/', jeN Nodes of G = (N, A) , including two special nodes, a' the super-source, and b
the super-sink
t,t Time periods: tj = 0, 1, 2, ... , T
(i,j)
t
Arc of G = (N, A) at time period t
Data:









tt au = 1 if i, e TV; , else a lt = if /, e tfJ.
,













a fcT -ar fl . +^.flT >1 (15)
0„>O V(/J), e^
^w = o
TE-MFD is totally unimodular and ifwe arbitrarily set a
a
, =0, then all variables
will be or 1 in an optimal extreme point solution.
B. THE TTME-EXPANDED INTERDICTION MODEL
Recall in Chapters I and II, that the network interdiction problem is stated as a
min-max problem. In the time-expanded network, the network user attempts to maximize
the time-weighted flow across the network over a specified time interval [0, T] . The
network interdictor attempts to minimize the time-weighted maximum flow by selecting an
appropriate interdiction set subject to the interdiction budget constraint.
We state the time-expanded model in a fundamentally different manner than we
state S-NTM. The approach that will be taken can best be illustrated with the static model
Recall that S-NTM is a min-max model in which interdictions reduce maximum arc
capacities to zero. An alternative formulation (Cormican, Morton and Wood, 1996)
subtracts interdicted flow in the objective function. This formulation is:
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S-NIM1
z*= min maxxba - 2>„x,, (5')
st Z*#- T x,=° V/eAr <6>
(1,7 )e^ (',/)e/l
0<
XlJ <u tJ V(i,j)eA (T)
where r = \y\ "£rijr,<R7 y i} e{0,l} V(/,y) eA\ (8)
We extend this model to a time-expanded dynamic network interdiction model.
The dynamic network interdiction problem allows each arc to have an additional attribute,
qy , an integer number of time periods required to repair arc (i,j) to full capacity starting
the period after the interdiction. Interdicting (/,/) at time t' means xiJt = for
t = t\t'+l,t,+2,...,?+q
iJ
. Nominal capacity u
i}




The time-expanded, network interdiction, min-max model is:
TE-NIM
Indices:
i,jeN Nodes of G = (N,A) , including two special nodes, a' the super-source, and
V the super-sink
t,t' Time periods: t,f= 0, 1, 2, ... , T
(ij)
t




Nominal capacity of arc (i,j),
T
tJ
Traverse time of arc (i,j)
t




Amount of resource required to interdict arc (i,j)
t
qv Repair time interval for arc {i,j) t (begins the period after interdiction)
R Resource for interdiction available to the network interdictor
Network user decision variables:
x
IJt
Flow on arc (i,j)
t
Interdictor decision variables:
Y ,}t Y yt - 1 indicates arc (i,j) t is interdicted at time /; otherwise y ijt =
The Formulation:
,TE*
= min max xbvT - ]T ( ^y ijV )xm
{U)t eA* t'=t-qiJ




i} \/{iJ) t zA-





The form of the objective function (16) reflects the struggle between the network user
who seeks to maximize flow through the network and the network interdictor who, using
interdiction resources, seeks to minimize that maximum flow. Flow through the network
is represented by the flow across the return arc {b\d) T . The network interdictor
removes flow from the network (effectively) by subtracting flow across interdicted arcs.
Constraints (17) are the flow balance constraints. (A model variant would allow storage
at node /, by creating "inventory" arcs from /, to iM .) The arc capacity constraints (18)
limit the maximum amount of flow entering an arc at time period t to the nominal capacity.
Interdiction resource constraint (19) limits the interdiction effort by the amount of
resource available R.
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C. A CONSTRAINED MINIMUM CUT MODEL
We convert the inner maximum flow problem of TE-NIM to its dual, the minimum
cut model to obtain:
TE-NIM1
Indices:




t,f Time periods: t,f= 0, 1, 2, ... , T




Nominal capacity of arc (i,j)
t
Tjj Traverse time of arc (i,j)
t
,




Amount of resource required to interdict arc (i,j)
t
qfj Repair time interval for arc (i,j) t (begins the period after interdiction)




- 1 if i
t
e Nb , , elsea Jf =























r,f g{0,1} V(i,/) t eA
T
r b .a .T ^o
Because there is no advantage gained by the interdictor interdicting more often
t
than necessary, we may assume that ^ y iit , is or 1 in any optimal solution to TE-
NTM1. Thus, we may interpret a solution of this model as in the static model: The
solution of this model identifies a cut defined by a
lt
= 1 for all i
t





. For arcs (i,j)
t
not in the cut, y lJt = fiijt - 0. For arc (i,j) t in the cut, either
fiijt - 1 , indicating that this arc forms part of the minimum capacity cut after interdiction
or the arc is part of the interdicted set A] where
A] = {(i,j)
t
eA T \y jr = 1 for / - q tj < /'< t) . So, the interdicted set identifies arcs and
time periods in which those arcs are interdicted or are under repair (and thus out of
commission).
Note the distinction between "interdiction set" and "interdicted set" for the
dynamic problem: The interdiction set A TS c A] comprises those arcs, (i,j) t for which
y ijt = 1 indicating a "strike" or interdiction resource expenditure occurs. Arcs in the
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interdicted set with y lJt - have previously been interdicted and are still under repair
during time period t; they have no capacity, but require no expenditure of interdiction
resource.
TE-NIM is clearly an NP-complete problem, and even small problems can be
difficult to solve. However, ifwe could relax the interdiction budget constraint, TE-NIM 1
would become easy.
D. LAGRANGIAN RELAXATION FOR TE-NEVI1
We approach Lagrangian relaxation for TE-NTM as we did for S-NDVI: We move
the budget constraint, with a Lagrangian multiplier, into the objective function. The
Lagrangian relaxation model provides a lower bound to zm * and when we relax the
integrality constraints, is a concave function in X. In the process of finding lower bounds
we find feasible and infeasible solutions to TE-NIM 1. (A feasible solution is a binary
solution for which constraint (19) holds.) Any feasible solution yields an upper bound on
z
Since zm (X) is a concave function, we look for the best X using binary search to
find the greatest lower bound. The Lagrangian multiplier acts as a penalty adding cost to
the minimization. Large values of X encourage less use of interdiction resources while
small values encourage use ofmore resource to minimize the overall cost. As we adjust X,
we hope to find a solution for which the difference between the upper and lower bounds is
small.
Because of the relaxation, z TE (X)<z TE*, but as we adjust X we may find a
Lagrangian multiplier such that
^L rl}Y i}t - R Then,
'r 'H (uj),£A T (>J),eA r ' H (,,j),eA T
(21)
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and the corresponding set of interdiction decisions is both feasible and optimal. In
economic terms, at optimality, the value of the Lagrangian multiplier A is the value of an
additional unit of interdiction resource.
The Lagrangian relaxation of TE-NTM1 is:
TE-LR(A)











PlJt >0 VQ,j) t eA
T
^,£{0,1} VQ9j) t eAT
If we restrict y ijt to binary values, TE-LR(A) will naturally have binary extreme
point solutions. We can therefore relax the binary constraints on a
lt
and fim . We then







s.t. a it -a jt + 2> y, + /?,„ ^0 V(/,y) f <=A T -(b',a')T
a
it





a b'T = ]
p 1Jt >0 V(i,j) t eA
T
0< r ..,<i V(i,j) t *A
T
Yb'a'T =
For a fixed A:
z
ro (A) ^ z' 7® (1) - AR where z™ (A) = min £ («„^ + A- y )
.
Note that 2 rF (A) will still yield a valid lower bound on z rc*. Instead of solving TE-
LRR(A) directly, we can solve its dual:
TE-LRR-Dl(A)
z
TE (A) = max xb ,a ,T - AR
St










< W . V(i,j)
t
eA : (25)
0<X x„,<^. V{i,J) t eAT (26)
TE-LRR-Dl(A) would be a simple maximum flow problem without constraints











= because there is no "useful" path from a source node to a sink
node that includes (i,j), ; therefore constraint (26) is slack (a useful path is
a path from a source to a sink with flow arriving at a sink before time
period T+ 1),
2. arc capacities do not change over time, and thus
3 the same amount of flow will be pushed along in every time period until
any path containing (ij) is no longer useful, and x
iJt
goes to zero.
Note that a restriction of this model must still lead to a valid lower bound on z TE *
.
As in the static problem, the flow on each arc must meet both of the capacity
constraints, (25) and (26). We restate model TE-LRR-Dl(zl) with the restricted capacity
constraints (26) as:
TE-LRR-D2(A)
z™ (A) = max xb ,a .T - AR
Jt






,<min{Wy ,^} V(iJ) t €AT <27>
This model is much like the maximum flow model TE-MF with capacities modified
by the value of an interdiction. Any solution to TE-LRR-D2(/l) finds a minimum capacity






eNTv ,ait =\ Vi, eA^,
2. y = fi.Jt = V arcs (ij), that are not forward arcs in the cut,
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3. for t = \,...,T, i
t
&NT
a,Jt &Nl and x1Jt =-^, for each arc in the
interdicted set, y ... is defined recursively as y ... = 1 - max y llt . ,
' J
max{0,f-<j. }<t'<t-\ ]
4. rv = Vz, € A^ , 7 , g A^fc
r
and *,, <^ , and
5. pijt = 1 if i t &N Ta,,j t eN£ and xl}t = u1} , i.e., if (i,j) t is a forward arc of
the minimum cut and u
tJ
< —^ , then (i,j)
t
is not in the interdicted set.
Note that X can always be perturbed so that u
tj
=
—^ does not occur. The solution is
feasible if the interdiction budget constraint (19) holds.
E. A METHOD OF SOLVING THE TIME-EXPANDED NIM
As in the static problem, we use a polynomial-time maximum flow algorithm to
solve TE-LRR-D2(A). (See Appendix B.) The algorithm actually runs in pseudo-
polynomial-time since the network is represented in time-expanded form. As in the static
network interdiction model, arcs in the minimum cut are examined to find the
corresponding interdicted set Aj that may or may not be feasible. If Aj is feasible for T,
the maximum flow for the time-expanded network after interdiction is an upper bound on
the solution to the network interdiction model.
The objective function for model TE-LRR(/l) is a concave function in X. We find
the maximum value of zTE (X) using binary search on X. Given a starting value for X, and
given an interdiction vector T, we decrease X if ^JuTm < ^ encouraging use of more
interdiction resource. We increase X if ^r
ffya > R, raising the penalty for exceeding
the interdiction budget. In equation (21) for NTM, we know that have found an optimal
solution the static problem if ^^yT y - -^ ana< we st0P our search for the best value of X,
0,J)€A
X*. For the dynamic problem, we cannot make the same claim nor should we stop our
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search for A*. Because we use a restricted form of constraint (26) in TE-LRR-D2(/l), we
may find two interdiction sets, both consuming R units of interdiction resource and one set
may be better than the other. For example, suppose solving TE-LRR-D2(X) for a value of
X identifies interdiction set A, which consumes R units of interdiction resource and
contains (i,j)
t
and (jJ)M with q l} =1. We re-solve TE-LRR-D2(A) for a value of
X + s {s > and small) finding interdiction set B, also consuming R units of interdiction
resource and containing (i,J)M (and not (i,j) t ). If xlj(l+2) <jJ^, then interdiction set B
is not optimal. It may be that, if we do not restict constraint (26), then any solution that
uses exactly R units of interdiction resource, is optimal. We are not able to test this theory
in this thesis.
In Chapter II, we introduced a method for discriminating between arcs with equal
capacity. This method is particularly useful in the time-expanded network since each arc
is represented in multiple time periods. We again add a very small random amount of
capacity to each arc. We add a random (r+l)/l,000,000 to 2,500(7'+l)/l,000,000 of
capacity to each arc. We accomplish this by multiplying all capacities by a scaling factor
of 1,000,000 and then add a random amount that varies uniformly from 1 to 2,500
multiplied by the number of time periods plus one.
Additionally, the algorithm may need to discriminate between the same arc in
different time periods. After scaling and randomization, we add one unit of capacity for
each time period so that each copy of arc (i,j) has an increasing capacity over time. As a
result, u
lJt
<w,y(r+1) and if (i,j) t is in the interdicted set, then —j^ < uijt <uij(t+]) so that
(i,j)M is also in the interdicted set. However, since ulj{t_ X) <u1Jt , then we may have
u
v(t-\) < T^T < ui,t anc* arc (JJ) t-\ would not be in the interdicted set.
Because of these small amounts of additional capacity for each arc, the algorithm is
able to differentiate between arcs that would otherwise appear identical. These
perturbations cause only negligible changes in the maximum flow in the network.
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We use the same modified shortest augmenting-path algorithm (Edmonds and
Karp, 1972) to solve LRR-D2(^) as we use for solving TE- LRR-D2(A). We implement
the Lagrangian relaxation and solve a maximum flow problem to identify a minimum cut
A TC and a set of interdicted arcs Aj c A TC . An interdicted set may contain the same arc
in multiple time periods. We therefore screen the interdicted set to find the interdiction set
by selecting arcs that would not be under repair from an interdiction in a previous time
period. For example, suppose arc (/,./), with a repair time of two time periods is
interdicted at time t — 21. If arcs (i,j) 22 , (',y) 23 and (/,y) 24 also appear in the
interdicted set, then arcs (i,j) 22 an<^ ('»./") 23 are not Part °f tne interdiction set since they
are under repair. Arcs (i,j) 2i and (i,j) 24 are in the interdiction set consuming r% +rij
units of interdiction resource. After finding the interdiction set, the algorithm adds the
amount of interdiction resource required for the current interdiction set and adjusts the
Lagrangian multiplier accordingly. Uninterdicted flow is the sum of the flow on arcs in
the cut that are not in the interdicted set.
36
IV. COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS
Chapters II and III show how to use Lagrangian relaxation to approximately solve
static and dynamic network interdiction problems. The algorithms that implement the
methods are described in Appendices A and B. In this chapter, we provide computational
results for these algorithms. We describe the networks tested in Section A, present the
results for the static problem in Section B and the results for the dynamic problem in
Section C.
A. TEST NETWORK DESIGN
We do not attempt to model an actual transportation network in this thesis since
our purpose is simply to test the proposed formulations and methods. We generate





static networks and, r
tj , utJ , ry
and ql} for the dynamic networks. We use single- and
multiple-source networks and single- and multiple-sink networks. We include arcs that
are uninterdictable and some arcs with z
y
= in the dynamic networks. In general, arcs
immediately adjacent to the source (or super-source) and sink (or super-sink) are given a
large capacity and large r
y
so that a trivial interdiction set adjacent to these nodes is not
optimal.
As stated in the appendices, we employ a maximum flow algorithm that uses a
breadth-first-search labeling method to find a shortest augmenting path from a source to a
sink. The test programs implement the Static Network Interdiction Heuristic of Appendix
A which solves LRR-D2(/l) (the dual of the Lagrangian relaxation of NTM-1), and
implement the Dynamic Network Interdiction Heuristic of Appendix B which solves TE-
LRR-D2(A) (the dual of the Lagrangian relaxation of TE-NIM1).
We study six test networks, called SNET25, DNET25, SNET100, DNET100,
SNET400, and DNET400. A general description of each test network follows: SNET25
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has 25 nodes and 64 arcs with artificial arcs from a super-source to five sources and
artificial arcs from four sinks to a super-sink. We include 1 1 arcs that are uninterdictable.
DNET25 is a dynamic network that shares the same arc attributes as the static test
network, SNET25, plus the time attributes. DNET25, in time expanded form, has 525
nodes with 1,344 arcs for T= 20, and 1,275 nodes with 3,264 arcs for T= 50. It also has
artificial arcs from a super-source to five sources and artificial arcs from four sinks to a
super-sink for each time period.
SNET100 is based on a 10-node by 10-node grid and has 100 nodes and 359 arcs.
A super-source is connected to five sources in each network and a super-sink is connected
to five sinks in each network. Only these artificial arcs are uninterdictable. DNET 1 00 has
the same structure as SNET100, but in time-expanded form. It has 5,100 nodes with
17,901 arcs for T= 50, and 8,100 nodes with 28,431 arcs for T= 80
SNET400 is based on a 20-node by 20-node grid and has 400 nodes and 1519
arcs. A super-source is connected to eleven sources in each network and a super-sink is
connected to ten sinks in each network. These artificial arcs are uninterdictable, as are
several arcs that we arbitrarily selected in the center of the grid; perhaps these arcs are
uninterdictable for political reasons. DNET400 has the same structure as SNET400, but
in time-expanded form. It has 32,400 nodes with 123,039 arcs for T = 80, and 40,400
nodes with 153,419 arcs for T= 100
B. STATIC NETWORKS
The results of testing static networks SNET25, SNET100 and SNET400 are listed
in Tables 1 and 2. Testing indicates that the Static Network Interdiction Heuristic
(Appendix A) often finds an optimal or near-optimal solution, but sometimes fails
dramatically. Data sets with r
i}
= 1 are usually solved optimally.
The best upper bound, z *, on a solution to the network interdiction problem is
the maximum flow in the network after the best (feasible) interdiction set is applied. By
"best" we mean the smallest observed maximum flow over all feasible solutions obtained
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by the algorithm. The best lower bound, z(X*) , is the value of z(X) , computed from
LRR-D2(A), maximized over all values of X. (Actually, the lower bound is slightly
pessimistic because we stop the algorithm when the interval of uncertainty on X* is less
than or equal to 1.) The optimality gap, both absolute and relative measures the quality of
the best solution found. The absolute optimality gap is computed as z * -z(X*) and the
. . .
\00%(z * -z(X*))
relative optimality gap is . The network interdictor would probably be
z(X*)
more interested in knowing the quality of the solution in terms of interdicted flow. The
percentage of maximally interdicted flow achieved is a percentage of the "worst case"
100%(z *-z*)
interdiction divided by the "best case" interdiction where z* is the value
(z *-z(X*))
of the maximum uninterdicted network flow. The "worst case" is the best known feasible
solution that interdicts (z *-z*) units of flow. The "best case" is an unknown solution
that may interdict as much as (z * -z(X*)) units of flow.
It is interesting to see how solution quality varies as a function of the arc
parameters and the amount of interdiction resource applied. Table 2 gives the results of




For results A, we vary r
i}
and R such that R is six times the midpoint of the r
y
interval. Solution quality in terms of either the optimality gap or the percentage of
maximally interdicted flow shows no relationship with increasing the interval width on r
X]
.
While the algorithm seeks the best interdiction set for a given amount of interdiction
resource, we find that in some cases, generally where the quality of the solution is poor,
decreasing R slightly and re-solving the problem provides a result that interdicts the same
amount of flow. For example, comparing SNET400-1 (the first result for SNET400) in
Table 1, with result A-l in Table 2, we see that the upper bounds are the same. Result A-
1 is just as effective at interdicting the network flows with R = 6 as the Table 1 result
39
fewer units of interdiction resource. When the relative optimality gap and the percent of
maximally interdicted flow indicate a poor quality solution, we recommend that the
network interdictor vary the amount of interdiction resource available and re-solve the
problem.
For results B, we vary the interval width on the uniformly distributed capacities
u
tj . Results B-l and B-2 have the same network structure and interval width. The
capacities are scalar multiples of each other and, as expected, the bounds and network
flows are also scalar multiples. Results B-l through B-6 are optimal for SNET400 with
six units of interdiction resource allowed. We use the same random number seed to
generate the random arc capacities for each test network and, as a result, find the same
interdiction set for each solution.
40
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corresponding static test networks in Section B with the additional arc attributes of T
i}
and q l} . The
results of testing the dynamic networks are listed in Tables 3 and 4. Testing indicates that the
Dynamic Network Interdiction Hueristic (Appendix B) finds results with a relative optimality gap of
less than 15% in 13 of 24 test networks but sometimes fails to find an answer with a relative
optimality gap of less than 100%.
The long run times associated with the dynamic networks are due to the exponential (pseudo-
polynomial) increase in size of the network and a similar increase in the number of paths to the sinks.
The results show that run times of the time-expanded problems depend strongly on the time horizon,
T. We are unable to test a network with 10,000 arcs because of excessive run time.
The best upper bound, z TE\ on a solution to the time-expanded network interdiction
problem is the maximum flow in the network after the best (feasible) interdiction set is applied. As in
the static problem, by "best" we mean the smallest observed maximum flow over all feasible
solutions obtained by the algorithm. The best lower bound, z TE (A*), is the value of z TE (X),
computed from TE-LRR-D2(A), maximized over all values of X. We again use optimality gap, both
absolute and relative, to measure the quality of the best solution found.
The results for the dynamic networks show a general decline in solution quality for the larger
networks. While static networks with r
t}
= 1 are often solved optimally, dynamic networks with
r
l}
- 1 are not usually solved optimally and consistently yield results that are worse than networks
with r
X]
distributed uniformly on [1,10]. While we are unable to find the reason for the declining
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Table 4 gives the results of sensitivity testing using DNET400 as the test network and






and qv . The arc attributes tested are uniformly distributed on the
interval indicated and the random number seed is the same for each network tested. The results





For results C, we vary r
tJ
and R such that R is six times the midpoint of the r
tj
interval. The
solution quality for each set is very poor in terms of both relative optimality gap and percent of
maximally interdicted flow. There seems to be a strong relationship between increasing interval
width on r
y
(with increasing R) and decreasing solution quality.
We observe several interesting interactions for this data set. As R increases, X *, which is
roughly the value of an additional unit of interdiction resource, decreases. Both the upper and lower
bounds are decreasing for increasing interval width on r
tJ
and increasing R, meaning more flow is
interdicted. As the optimality gap decreases, the relative optimality gap balloons since the
denominator, the lower bound gets smaller. We include another measure of the quality of the
solution for this purpose. The percent of maximally interdicted flow remains around 50% for results
C-2 through C-5.
It is interesting to compare Table 4, result C-l, with R = 6, to Table 3, DNET400-1 with R =
5. The Table 4, C-l result has a solution that removes 546 additional units of capacity from the
network by expending six units of interdiction resource versus five units for the Table 3, DNET400-1
result. With R = 6, the lower bound is less than with R = 5; this indicates a potential for an even
better solution when R = 6. Comparing the large relative optimality gaps of 392.6% for Table 4 C-l
and 181.8% for Table 3, DNET400-1, we are less sure of the quality of the known result forR = 6.
The optimality gaps for Table 4 C-3, C-4 and C-5 are extremely large and out of proportion
to the percent of maximally interdicted flow. The rapidly degrading quality of the solutions leads us
to investigate better solutions such as adjusting R slightly. Testing the network C-4 with R = 22
instead ofR =24, we find a solution that has the same upper bound. To compare the solutions we
use the percent of maximally interdicted flow, 52.5% for R = 22 compared to 49.6% for R = 24, a
small improvement. This leads us to recommend that the network interdictor use the percent of
maximally interdicted flow as an indicator of whether it would be useful to look for other solutions
46
by varying the amount of interdiction resource available by one or two units and re-solving the
problem.
For results D in Table 4, we vary the interval width on the uniformly distributed capacities
u
l}
. The first two results have the same structure with arc capacities that are approximate scalar
multiples. (Recall that we increase the capacity of each arc one unit per time period after scaling.)
As expected, the interdiction sets are the same and the bounds with for D-2 are approximately 50
times those of D-l. In the static network sensitivity testing, the interdiction set was consistent across
the six test networks. The dynamic test networks have interdiction sets that change for each change
in capacity interval width.
For results E, we vary the interval width on the uniformly distributed arc traversal time, r
.
There is no observable relationship between the interval width and solution quality. As expected, the
amount of flow through the network decreases as the average traversal times increase.
For results F, we vary the interval width on the uniformly distributed repair times q, . There
is strong relationship between this interval width and the quality of the solution both in terms of the
relative optimality gap and the percent of maximally interdicted flow: Solution quality declines as we
increase the interval width. Result F-l assumes repair occurs immediately after interdiction, i.e.,
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The poor quality of our results for the dynamic networks seems to be caused
largely by including arc repair time in the model. However, including arc repair time is
one of the major motivations for exploring dynamic networks in this thesis. There may be
methods for improving the bounds and the quality of the results that take into account the
width of the interval for q 1} . Due to time constraints, we cannot explore such possibilities
in this thesis.
Our testing found several test networks, both static and dynamic, where the
algorithm never finds a solution that uses all R units of interdiction resource. For
A-A*-s (s>0 and small) we find an interdiction set that is infeasible while for
X - X * +s we find an interdiction set that is feasible but does not use all R units of




= 1 . However, we have been unable to find this solution using the
methods proposed in this thesis.
We use a modified shortest augmenting path maximum flow algorithm by
Edmonds and Karp (1972) which runs in 0{nm 2 ) time for a network with n nodes and m
arcs. The run times can probably be improved significantly by using a faster pre-flow push
maximum flow algorithm such as the excess scaling algorithm which runs in




This thesis presents optimization-based heuristic methods to solve two forms of a
network interdiction problem, a "static network interdiction problem" and a "dynamic
time-expanded network interdiction problem." While static network interdiction models
have been studied before, we develop a new heuristic method that provides a good
feasible solution and upper and lower bounds on the optimal solution value. We also
develop heuristic methods to find a good feasible solution to a time-expanded dynamic
network interdiction model with bounds on the optimal solution value. The dynamic
model allows us to consider arc traversal times, repair of interdicted arcs and time-
weighted flow— the weight is a or 1 depending on the time that the flow arrives at the
sink.
We model network interdiction problems as min-max models where the network
user maximizes flow through a capacitated network while the network interdictor
minimizes that maximum flow by interdicting (destroying) arcs using limited assets.
Both static and dynamic forms of the problem can be formulated as constrained
minimum cut models that are difficult to solve. An interdiction budget constraint
complicates the problem. By relaxing this constraint, we are able to use a sequence of
maximum flow problems to approximately solve the original problem. For both forms of
the problem, we use Lagrangian relaxation to find a lower bound on the optimal solution
value. In the process of maximizing the lower bound, we find feasible solutions with
corresponding upper bounds. The difference between the upper and lower bounds, the
optimality gap, indicates the quality of the solution. We search for the best lower and
upper bounds and hope that the difference is small.
The Lagrangian relaxation procedure for both the static and dynamic problems can
have difficulty finding an optimal solution when many arcs have the same capacity. In
particular, the solution methodology may interdict all of the arcs in a cut with the same
capacity or none of them. To avoid this, all arc capacities are randomized by small
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amounts. As a result the algorithm is able to differentiate between arcs in a cut, yet the
optimal solution value changes only negligibly. Additionally, the dynamic network
interdiction problem requires that we have a method to differentiate between copies of an
arc in multiple time periods. We accomplish this by adding a small increment of capacity
for each time period so that arc capacity u
IJt
< «y(f+1) for all arcs (i,j) and time periods t.
Testing with several grid networks shows that 7 of 12 instances of the static
network interdiction problem are solved optimally. Four more solutions have relative
optimality gaps that are less than 30%. The remaining solution has a relative optimality
gap of 81.5%. The quality of this last solution is poor since only a part of the available
interdiction resource is used. The result can probably be improved by further perturbing
the arc capacities so that more of the interdiction resource is expended.
The dynamic networks in time-expanded form are 20 to 100 times larger than the
static networks. This results in longer computation time and larger optimality gaps than
seen for the static networks. Specifically, 13 of 24 solutions have relative optimality gaps
that are less than 15% and six more are between 15% and 30%. The remaining five
solutions are of poor quality with relative optimality gaps between 30% and 195%.
Closing these optimality gaps will require further research.
We have several suggestions for further work and possible model improvements
for the dynamic network interdiction problem.
1. We do not model arbitrary time-weighted flow since the decomposition
methods that are probably required to solve such a problem are beyond the
scope of this thesis. However, military engagements often last for long
periods of time and there may be a need to assign one weight for flows
arriving before a battle, another weight for replenishing expended wartime
commodities such as ordnance and fuel during the battle, and another
weight for flow arriving after the battle. The Bender's decomposition
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method described by Cormican (1995) for the static network interdiction
problem would probably be applicable to this problem.
2. The restriction step that converts constraints (26) to constraints (27)
reduces the quality of the lower bounds obtained. It may be possible to
avoid this by:








(b) using Lagrangian relaxation on (19a) and (19b) with separate
Lagrangian multipliers for each relaxed constraint.
This would entail more computational effort, but the improved solution
quality might be worth the effort.
3
.
There is an assumption that the capacity and traversal time of each arc in a
network are known and fixed. In fact, environmental effects and congestion
may add a stochastic element to the arc capacities and traversal times. The
dynamic network interdiction model could be improved by using stochastic arc
capacities (Cormican, Morton and Wood, 1996) and stochastic traversal times.
These extensions would be difficult, however.
4. It is assumed in our model that the repair time of an arc is fixed and that an
interdicted arc has no capacity until repair is complete. While the "all or
nothing" arc capacity may be valid from some arcs such as a bridge
crossing a ravine, when the interdiction on an arc is in the form of an
inspection or blockade, the effect of the interdiction will tend to degrade
53
with time. Interdictions could be modeled with a decreasing effectiveness
as time passes.
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APPENDIX A. HEURISTIC ALGORITHM FOR THE STATIC NIP
The heuristic algorithm described here finds a feasible solution and bounds for the
static network interdiction problem. Essentially, it maximizes the lower bound, z(X), the
value of the Lagrangian relaxation, LRR-D2(X) but it also identifies feasible solutions to
the network interdiction problem and reports the best lower and upper bounds and the
best set of arcs to interdict (the interdiction set). The upper bound corresponds to the
maximum flow through the network when a feasible interdiction set is found.
Static Network Interdiction Heuristic
This heuristic seeks X*, the best value of the Lagrangian multiplier, by conducting a binary
search on the interval of uncertainty for X. The heuristic solves a maximum flow problem
for each value of X using the results to adjust X and the endpoints of the interval. The
initial left endpoint of the interval of uncertainty is slightly smaller than the smallest arc
capacity, and the right endpoint is slightly larger than the largest arc capacity. X is initially
set to the value of the right endpoint. Inside a do-while loop, the heuristic defines arc





}. The arc capacities and the network graph are inputs to the
procedure findmax flow, which solves the maximum flow problem, identifying a cut Ac ,
arc flows and the maximum flow through the network xba . The cut, arc flows, and
original arc capacities are passed to the procedure find_interdiction_set. This procedure
interprets the results from the maximum flow procedure returning the interdiction set, a
potential upper bound and the amount of interdiction resource consumed by the
interdiction set. If a feasible solution is found, the heuristic compares the incumbent upper
and lower bounds with the current bounds keeping the better values. The heuristic also
stores the best interdiction set. The procedure adjustlambda takes X and the endpoints of
the interval of uncertainty, the interdiction resource consumed by the current solution, and
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the amount of interdiction resource available as input, and returns a new value for X with
adjusted endpoints for the new interval of uncertainty. The heurustic re-starts the
sequence with a new value of X until either an optimal solution is found (the interdiction
set expends exactly R units of interdiction resource) or the endpoints of the interval of
uncertainty for X converge to a value within one unit of A*. The heuristic prints the best
interdiction set found, the upper and lower bounds, and the amount of interdiction
resource consumed by the interdiction set.
procedure BOUND_THE_STATIC_PROBLEM
Input: Network G = (N,A) with source or super-source, a e N and sink or super-
sink identified, b gN
,
u , integer arc capacities u
y
> V(z,y) e A
,
r , integer interdiction resource requirements r
t]
> V(i,j) e A
,
and
R, total interdiction resource available.
Output: The best feasible interdiction set found A2 ,
UB
,
an upper bound for the network interdiction problem,
LB
,
a lower bound for the network interdiction problem,






/* find the initial endpoints for the interval of uncertainty for X */
^ m»v <— max u„ +1
;
ax ,. .. . /L . y '
^ m ,n <- nrin «„ - 1;i -. ... - « . II '(i,j)£A-(b,a) J
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Do{





} for all (i,j) &A; I* reset the adjusted arc capacities*/




, R) <— find_interdiction_set( ^4C , £, u );
if ( R < R ) { /* a feasible solution has been found*/








(^^ min^ miJ<-adjust_lambda(A,A mm ,A max ,A^);
} while (A_ - A mln >l and tf * tf)
print(^, UB,LB,R);
} End;
The procedure find_max_flow finds the standard maximum flow in the directed
network G with source a, sink b and arc capacities u'
.
procedure find_max_flow( G, a, b, u'
)
Input: Network graph G - (N, A) with source or super-source, a e N and sink or
super-sink identified, b gN
,
u', integer arc capacities u
tJ
> V(z,y) e ^4 .
Output: ^c , a minimum capacity cut Ac a A ,
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£ , vector of maximum arc flows xi; > V(/,y) e A ,
xba , maximum flow value.
{ This procedure uses a standard shortest-augmenting path maximum flow algorithm
(Edmonds and Karp, 1972) that is modified to find the maximum residual capacity
among all the "shortest paths." Shortest path means the path with the minimum
number of arcs.
return ( Ac , £ , xba );
}End;
The procedure findinterdictionset takes the cut, network arc flows, and arc
capacities as input. It identifies and returns an interdiction set, an upper bound, and the
amount of resource consumed.
procedure findinterdictionset ( Ac , £, u
)
Input: Ac , minimum capacity cut in G,
£ , vector ofmaximum arc flows, and







a potential upper bound on the optimal solution of the network
interdiction problem,





for (each (ij) eAc ) {
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/*upper bound is the capacity of the minimum cut after interdiction*/
UB't-UB'+Uy;
else{





The procedure adjust_lambda returns a new value for X and adjusted endpoints for
the new interval of uncertainty. We look for X* using binary search until either an optimal
solution is found or the endpoints for the interval of uncertainty converge. If the
endpoints converge, X < X* < X + 1 and we have found the maximum lower bound with
only negligible error.
procedure adjustlambda (X, X
min , X max , R, R)
Input: X , Lagrangian multiplier,
X mm ,X max , lower and upper endpoints for interval of uncertainty on X ,
R
,
amount of resource consumed by the interdiction set, and
R, amount of interdiction resource available.
Output: X
,
new value of the Lagrangian multiplier, and
X
min , X max , new lower and upper endpoints for X .
Begin {
if (R = R ) /*an optimal solution has been found*/
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else if ( R > R ) /*solution is infeasible, need a larger value of X */
X- <r- X ;mm '
else /*feasible solution has been found, try a smaller value of X */
A — "T A,*™ + ^™,« i2 L_ max mm J '
return(A,A mm ,A max );
}End;
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APPENDIX B. HEURISTIC ALGORITHM FOR THE DYNAMIC NIP
This heuristic algorithm finds a feasible solution and bounds for the dynamic
network interdiction problem. Essentially, it maximizes the lower bound, z TE (X), the
value of the Lagrangian relaxation, TE-LRR-D2(A) but it also identifies feasible solutions
to the network interdiction problem and reports the best lower and upper bounds and the
best set of arcs to interdict (the interdiction set). The upper bound corresponds to the
maximum flow through the dynamic network when a feasible interdiction set is found.
Dynamic Network Interdiction Heuristic
This heuristic seeks X*, the best value of the Lagrangian multiplier, by conducting a binary
search on the interval of uncertainty for X. The heuristic solves a maximum flow problem
for each value of X using the results to adjust X and the endpoints of the interval. The
initial left endpoint of the interval of uncertainty is slightly smaller than the smallest arc
capacity, and the right endpoint is slightly larger than the largest arc capacity. X is initially
set to the value of the right endpoint. Inside a do-while loop, the heuristic defines arc
capacities as min{ u
X] ,
Xr
t] j'(qv + 1) }. The arc capacities and the time-expanded network
graph are inputs to the procedure findmax flow, which solves the maximum flow
problem, identifying a cut A TC , arc flows and the maximum flow through the network
xbwr The cut, arc flows, original arc capacities, and the time horizon are passed to the
procedure findinterdictionset. This procedure interprets the results from the maximum
flow procedure returning the interdiction set, a potential upper bound and the amount of
interdiction resource consumed by the interdiction set. If a feasible solution is found, the
heuristic compares the incumbent upper and lower bounds with the current bounds and
keeps the better values. The heuristic also stores the best interdiction set. The procedure
adjust_lambda takes X and the endpoints of the interval of uncertainty, the interdiction
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resource consumed by the current solution, and the amount of interdiction resource
available as input, and returns a new value for A with adjusted endpoints for the new
interval of uncertainty. The heuristic then re-starts the sequence with a new value of X
until the endpoints of the interval of uncertainty for A converge to a value within one unit
of A*. The heuristic prints the best interdiction set found, the upper and lower bounds,
and the amount of interdiction resource consumed by the interdiction set.
procedure BOUND_THE_DYNAMIC_PROBLEM
Input: Network G T =(NT ,A T ) with super-source, a' eiV7 , and super-sink,
b'eN T identified,






r , integer interdiction resource requirements r
X)
> V(/,y), £A T
,
R, total interdiction resource available, and
time horizon T.
Output: Best interdiction set found AJ ,
UB
,
an upper bound for the network interdiction problem,
LB
,
a lower bound, for the network interdiction problem,
R
,











mm t 'J '
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Do{




y /(<7,y +1)} for all (i,j) eA; /* reset the adjusted arc
capacities */
(A£, £, xb ,a ,T ) <- findmaxflow (GT ,a',b',u'),
(As ,\JB\R)<r- findjnterdictionset ( A
T
C , £, u, T );
if(R<R){ /* a feasible solution has been found*/









(>M„^max)<- adjustJambda (K* mmA m^R,R)\
} while (^ max -^ mm >l)
print (ATS ,UB,LB,R)\
} End;
The procedure findmaxflow finds the standard maximum flow in the directed
network G T with super-source a' , super-sink b , and arc capacities u'
.




Input: Network graph G T = (N T ,A T ) with super-source, a' e 7V r , and super-sink,
b'&N T identified,
u', integer arc capacities w
y
> V(z',y) e A .
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Output: A TC , a minimum capacity cut A
T
C a A,





,aT , maximum flow value.
{ This procedure uses a standard shortest-augmenting path maximum flow
algorithm (Edmonds and Karp, 1972) that is modified to find the maximum
residual capacity among all the "shortest paths." Shortest path means the path
with the minimum number of arcs.
return (ATC , £ , xb ,a ,T );
}End;
The procedure find_interdiction_set takes the cut, network arc flows, arc
capacities, and time horizon as input. It compares arcs in the cut by time period from
earliest to latest to identify an interdiction set. When an interdictable arc is found, the
procedure scans the cut marking that arc each time it appears from one to qt] time periods
after interdiction,. The procedure returns an interdiction set, an upper bound, and the
amount of resource consumed.
procedure findinterdictionset (A£ ,i, u, T)\
Input: A TC , a minimum capacity cut in G
T
,
£ , vector of maximum arc flows, and














A TC <- unmark(^) ; /*reset an indicator variable*/
for (t = to 7) {
for (each (/J), e^T) {




else if ((/', 7) t unmarked) {
add (ij)
t
to A TS ;
R^R + r,
} ;















return {A TS ,UB\R);
}End;
The procedure adjustlambda returns a new value for X and adjusted endpoints for
the new interval of uncerainty. We look for A* using binary search until the endpoints of
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the interval of uncertainty for X converge. When the endpoints converge, X < X* < X + 1
and we have found the maximum lower bound with only negligible error.
procedure adjustjambda (X, X mm , X max , R, R)
Input: X , Lagrangian multiplier,
X
min ,X max , lower and upper endpoints for interval of uncertainty on X ,
R, amount of resource consumed by the interdiction set, and
R
,
amount of interdiction resource available.
Output: X
,
new value of the Lagrangian multiplier, and
X mm ,X miX , new lower and upper endpoints for X .
Begin {
if ( R > R
)
/* solution is infeasible, need a larger value of X */
X mm <- X ;'
else /* solution is feasible, try a smaller value of X */
^
= 2L^max + ^mmj'
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